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  8 
Unconditional generosity in humans is a puzzle. One possibility is that individuals benefit 
from being seen as generous if there is competition for access to partners and if generosity is a 10 
costly - and therefore reliable - signal of partner quality [1-3]. The 'competitive helping' 
hypothesis predicts that people will compete to be the most generous, particularly in the 12 
presence of attractive potential partners [1]. However, this key prediction has not been 
directly tested. Using data from online fundraising pages, we demonstrate competitive helping 14 
in the real world. Donations to fundraising pages are public and made sequentially. Donors 
can therefore respond to the behavior of previous donors, creating a potential generosity 16 
tournament. Our test of the competitive helping hypothesis focuses on the response to large, 
visible donations. We show that male donors show significantly stronger responses (by 18 
donating more) when they are donating to an attractive female fundraiser and responding to a 
large donation made by another male donor. The responses for this condition are around four 20 
times greater than when males give to less attractive female (or male) fundraisers or when 
they respond to a large donation made by a female donor. Unlike males, females do not 22 
compete in donations when giving to attractive male fundraisers. These data suggest that 
males use competitive helping displays in the presence of attractive females and suggest a role 24 
for sexual selection in explaining unconditional generosity. 
 26 
  28 
 
Results and Discussion 30 
 
Despite individual incentives to free-ride, humans often cooperate in social dilemmas. In repeated, 32 
two-player games, individuals can benefit if the partner reciprocates [4]; while, in larger groups, the 
possibility that cheating will be punished [5] or that generous actions will be rewarded [6] are 34 
possible explanations for cooperation. Most of the evidence for punishment and rewarding, 
however, comes from laboratory studies, while the prevalence of these strategies in real-world 36 
settings has been questioned [5]. A plausible alternative - yet seldom acknowledged- mechanism is 
so-called competitive helping [2] (also known as 'competitive altruism' [1]). This theory assumes 38 
that there is a biological market [2], where individuals compete for access to partners with the 
highest market value by signalling their value through costly helping displays [1]. Signal reliability 40 
is maintained by the cost associated with sending it [3]. Extravagant helping displays might 
therefore serve as an honest signal of an individual's underlying quality [7], including access to 42 
resources or cooperative intent. Although the term 'competitive altruism' is commonly used to 
describe extravagant generosity (e.g. [1, 8-13]), competitive helping displays are not truly altruistic 44 
since the signaller is expected to derive personal benefits from their actions.  
 46 
Several laboratory studies offer evidence suggestive of competitive helping. People are more 
generous when they are observed [8-10] and the most helpful individuals are preferentially chosen 48 
for subsequent interactions requiring cooperation [11-13]. Costly helping displays could be used to 
attract sexual partners. Although males tend to prioritise physical cues of fertility when choosing 50 
mates [14], females place a higher premium on resource acquisition [14] and have also been shown 
to be more sensitive to cooperative tendency in sexual partners [15]  - both of which may be 52 
advertised via helpful actions. Thus, competitive helping might be particularly pronounced among 
males (although this does not preclude female-female competition in this or other contexts). Indeed, 54 
males are more sensitive than females to the presence of an opposite sex audience when performing 
helping behavior [9, 16]. While these various studies indicate that people are motivated to acquire a 56 
good reputation and that individuals might be preferred as partners on this basis, the acid test of 
competitive helping requires evidence that people compete directly, by increasing generosity in 58 
response to displays from competitors [1, 13]. To our knowledge, no study has provided evidence of 
responsive competitive helping. We do this here. 60 
 
We use data from a large, UK-based, online fundraising platform to test a key prediction of the 62 
competitive helping hypothesis: that males respond competitively to the generosity bids of other 
males in the presence of attractive females. Online fundraising platforms provide a unique forum to 64 
test this idea in a real world setting. Fundraisers host fundraising pages where they provide personal 
information (name, photo, charity and event they are being sponsored for) and collect donations, 66 
nearly all from donors personally known to them. Donations to fundraising pages are made 
sequentially and the names and contributions of all donors to a fundraiser's page are visible in 68 
chronological order (unless donors opt for anonymity), so that new donors can see who has donated 
before them and how much [17]. This creates a potential tournament in which donors may compete 70 
by responding to how much others have given. Previous work has shown that existing donations on 
a page act as an anchor for current donors, indicating that donors do pay attention to other donors' 72 
actions in this setting [17]. Here, we ask whether donors’ behavior was affected by the gender and 
attractiveness of the fundraiser and whether they competed with other donors of the same gender. 74 
 
For our analysis sample of 2,561 fundraising pages, the mean (± sem) number of donations per page 76 
was 42.8 (± 0.71), averaging £30.3 (± 0.22) per donor. The average total amount raised per page 
was £1,300.50 (± 28.4) (see Table S1 for all descriptive statistics). Regardless of their gender, more 78 
attractive fundraisers raised more money than less attractive fundraisers: a one-standard deviation 
increase in attractiveness was associated with an average £182.3 (± 54.0) increase in total amount 80 
raised by fundraisers, controlling for their age (linear regression: F1, 2544  = 11.4; P = 0.001; Table 
S2). Attractive fundraisers of both sexes received more donations (linear regression: F1, 2544 = 8.41; 82 
P = 0.004; Table S2) and, to a lesser extent, also received larger donations (linear regression: F1, 2544 
= 2.78; P = 0.10; Table S2). For female fundraisers, attractiveness was significantly correlated with 84 
maximum donation size (linear regression: F 1, 2543 = 9.08; P = 0.003; Table S2), which increased by 
£41.1 (± 13.6) with a one-standard deviation increase in attractiveness. 86 
 
Our test for competitive helping focused on donors’ responses to “large”, visible donations on a 88 
fundraising page (“large” was defined as at least twice the previous page mean and more than £50, 
sensu [17]). Responses to large donations were measured by calculating the difference in amount 90 
given after the large donation (£) relative to the mean donation size for that page prior to the large 
donation (hereafter the 'PRE-mean'). The PRE-mean was calculated using up to 10 (where 92 
available, sensu [17]) donations made prior to the large donation. Note that we only used donations 
made by donors of the same gender – so the male response is calculated relative to the PRE-mean 94 
defined for male donors. For each fundraising page, we considered the responses of up to 15 donors 
(where available) following the large donation, yielding a sample size of 1,800 for male donor 96 
responses and 1,295 for female donor responses. 'Fundraising page ID' was included as a random 
term in each model to control for the effects of repeated observations for the same fundraiser and 98 
fundraising page on the distribution of the data. 
 100 
Arriving on a fundraising page after large donations has been shown to have a positive effect on the 
size of donations with no effect on the quantity of donations [17]. In our sample, 1,829 pages had 102 
large donations (mean large donation size: £115.20 ± 2.69). Of these, 420 were made by males and 
248 by females, with the remainder not gender-assignable. We focus our analysis on the 668 large 104 
donations for which we could assign a gender. Summary statistics are given in Table S1. The size of 
a large donation did not significantly differ by either donor or fundraiser gender (tests for equality 106 
of means, all P > 0.05; see supplemental information). Results from a linear mixed model (LMM) 
with maximum likelihood shows that, in line with previous results [17], a large donation had a 108 
positive effect on subsequent amounts, increasing donations by £9.55 (± 1.27)..  
 110 
Under the competitive helping hypothesis, we expected a significantly stronger response by donors 
when (i) the fundraiser was an attractive member of the opposite sex (where “attractive” was 112 
defined as being within the top quartile); and (ii) the large donation was made by someone of the 
same sex. We contrasted the responses by donors in this “competitive helping” condition to their 114 
responses in all other cases. Results are summarized in Figure 1. For males, we found that a large 
donation was associated with an additional response of £28.35 (± 7.75) in the competitive helping 116 
case, over and above the average response in all other cases, which was £9.61 (± 1.61). This 
additional response by male donors in the competitive helping condition was significantly different 118 
to that in all other case (21, 1800 = 13.38; P < 0.001). However, when we ran a similar model for 
female donors, asking whether females would show a greater response when giving to an attractive 120 
male fundraiser and when the large donation was made by another female, we found that female 
donors did not show greater responses in the “competitive helping” case (χ 21, 1295  = 0.54; P = 122 
0.461).  
 124 
We then explored variation in male donor responses in more detail. Using the same response term 
(change in donation amount, £, relative to the PRE-mean) we ran a LMM with 'fundraising page ID' 126 
as the random term and the three-way interaction between three categorical explanatory variables: 
fundraiser gender (male / female), fundraiser attractiveness (plain / average / attractive), large donor 128 
gender (male / female). Thus, the model had a 2 x 3 x 2 design (Table S3) allowing us to check 
whether male responses would be strongest in the scenario predicted by competitive helping theory 130 
(i.e. when giving to an attractive female fundraiser and when the large donation was made by 
another male) compared to any of the other 11 possible scenarios.  The results are shown in Figure 2 132 
and confirm the expected pattern: male donors responded to a large donation to the greatest extent 
when giving to a female fundraiser who was attractive and when the large donation came from 134 
another male donor. Their response in this case was significantly greater (see Table S4) – and 
around four times larger – than their response in any of the other 11 cases.   136 
 
These results support a key prediction of competitive helping theory [1, 2, 13], by showing that 138 
male donors compete directly with other males in the presence of an attractive, opposite-sex 
audience, although we find no evidence for this in females. Whether competitive helping displays 140 
produce fitness benefits remains an open avenue for further exploration, although previous work has 
shown that more cooperative individuals are preferred as sexual partners [15]. We also note that 142 
competitive helping responses are not necessarily conscious responses either to the donations of 
others or to the perceived attractiveness of the fundraiser, but may instead reflect responses of an 144 
evolved psychology to maximise the benefits associated with helping in different contexts. Previous 
work has shown that donors are sensitive to the donations of others and in particular conform to 146 
descriptive social norms by giving what they believe is the normative amount [18]. In contrast, here 
we show that males do not conform to the majority when making donations but instead compete 148 
directly with other males when donating to attractive females. Excessively cooperative individuals 
can be shunned or punished [19] and sometimes opt for anonymity when making large donations 150 
[20]. Our findings provide a possible explanation for this, indicating that overt generosity can be a 
competitive rather than a cooperative act.  152 
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Figure 1. Change in amount given (£, effect size and confidence intervals from a single LMM) 208 
among male donors (N = 1800) and female donors (N = 1295) in response to a large donation 
relative to the PRE-mean. 'Competitive helping scenario' refers to the case where competitive 210 
helping would be expected. For males, this is an attractive female fundraiser and a large donation by 
another male donor. For females, this is an attractive male fundraiser and a large donation by 212 
another female donor. 'All other scenarios' are all other cases.  
 214 
  
Figure 2. Change in amount given (£, effect size and confidence intervals from a single LMM) 
among male donors (N = 1800) in response to a large donation relative to the PRE-mean. Responses 216 
to a large donation varied with the gender and attractiveness of the fundraiser and whether the large 
donation was made by (A) a male or (B) female donor. Male donors increased their giving by more 218 
when giving to an attractive female fundraiser and responding to a large donation made by a male 
competitor than in any other case.  220 
 
Methods 222 
Our initial sample consisted of 4,581 pages for the 2014 Virgin London Marathon for which 
fundraisers had uploaded one profile photo, allowing us to obtain an attractiveness rating. Of this 224 
initial sample, 91 had a URL that did not link to a page, leaving 4,490 pages. For these pages, we 
sought four independent beauty ratings (on a scale of 0 – 10) of each fundraiser based on their photo 226 
(following [21]) by recruiting 1,189 raters (651 males; 520 females; 16 did not specify) from the 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowdsourcing platform (www.mturk.com). The mean age of 228 
the raters was 31 ± 0.3 (range: 18 - 72). To minimise any confounding effects of inter-cultural 
differences in attractiveness ratings [22], only US-based workers were asked to provide ratings 230 
since the majority of workers on MTurk are based in the US and the US and UK are categorized as 
belonging to the same world culture [23]. Each rater was expected to look at 20 pages. As well as 232 
rating attractiveness, raters were also asked the gender of the fundraiser, what sort of clothes they 
were wearing (e.g. sporting / fancy dress), whether they were smiling, the colour of their hair and 234 
approximate age. The questions the raters were expected to answer are available as supplemental 
information. Donor gender was not observed directly but was inferred on the basis of their names, 236 
acquired from the fundraising pages. We were able to assign a gender to 46.1 % of the donors in our 
sample. Cases where we could not include ambiguous names (e.g. Sam, Chris), multiple names (e.g. 238 
Sue and David) and anonymous donations.  
 240 
We judged 2,561 fundraisers to have a valid set of attractiveness ratings where (i) they had at least 
three non-missing ratings and (ii) all raters agreed on the fundraiser's gender. The main reasons for 242 
missing ratings were that the photo was not of a person or was of more than one person, such that 
the fundraiser could not be identified. We found a high level of agreement among raters over the 244 
attractiveness of fundraisers: for our sample of 2,561 fundraisers, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.88 (0.63 
for male fundraisers and 0.94 for female fundraisers). For our analysis, we created standardized 246 
aggregate measures of attractiveness (ai) for each fundraiser in the following way (following [24]). 
Each rater rated up to 20 pictures and each fundraiser had three or four ratings. We first transformed 248 
the rating by rater j of fundraiser i into a z-score and then took the average of the three / four z-
scores for each fundraiser. In line with previous studies (e.g. [14]), gender, hair colour, age and 250 
whether the person was smiling were all significantly correlated with attractiveness (see 
supplemental information). For all further statistical details and tables please refer to the 252 
supplemental information. 
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